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Toward a Corporate Finance Theory for the Entrepreneurial Firm.
James S. Ang
Florida State University
College of Business
ABSTRACT
Corporate finance for the entrepreneurial firm is fundamentally different from
that of the traditional firm. The standard problems and solutions to both
investment and financing are reformulated in this paper. The formulation is
intended to capture two distinguishing features of entrepreneurial finance: 1)
Although new ventures yield negative returns on average, they are in aggregate
welfare increasing for the economy, after considering their positive
externalities. 2) Due to new ventures’ lack of consistent cash flows, which
precludes the use of debt, the debt versus equity financing choice is replaced by
the choice between the entrepreneurs’ desire for wealth versus control; taking
“a larger slice of a smaller pie,” or “a smaller slice of a larger pie.”
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Toward a Corporate Finance Theory for the Entrepreneurial Firms
I.
Introduction
Wealth of a nation derives from economic growth. Entrepreneurial success
is the engine. This is especially true for the developed economies whereas, in
contrast, developing economies can still generate growth through copying and
catching up. Over the long run, economies whose culture encourages
entrepreneurship, with qualities such as risk taking, independence, and
tolerance of failure, have more entrepreneurial activities and thus grow faster
than their counterparts.
Finance, in particular the availability of money for investing in
entrepreneurial ventures, and financial management, the strategic use of the
funds in both investing and financing, play vital roles in initiating and fostering
entrepreneurial activities, from the provision of nutrients in the incubator (seed
money and crowdfunding) to delivery in the birth of a new public company
(IPO).
In want of a corporate finance theory for entrepreneurial firms, extant
corporate finance theory, which was developed for prototypical firms, is the
only alternative available to practitioners and researchers of these enterprising
young firms. The ‘one size fits all’ corporate finance theory is rationalized on
the grounds that the fundamental principles underlying the extant theory are so
basic to all firms that it is indeed the general theory of corporate finance. Some
attempts have been made to give the extant theory more of a twist toward
entrepreneurial firms by emphasizing the greater importance of agency and
information issues. However, since these are the standard bearers of the extant
theory, the attempt is akin to a repackaging (old wine in a new bottle).
Is there a need for a different theory of corporate finance, one that is more
suitable for the entrepreneurial firm? This paper addresses the question in three
parts. Section 2 explains that extant corporate finance theory fails because its
determinants lose most of their relevance in the environment of entrepreneurial
firms. In section 3, issues that are unique or more germane to the entrepreneurial
firms are discussed. Sections 4, based on the issues uncovered in the previous
section, speculates on some possible corporate finance models for the
entrepreneurial firms. The influence of behavioral considerations is discussed.
Section 6 concludes.
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II.

Extant Financial Theory: View from the Entrepreneurial Firm

This section takes a critical examination of the workhorses of the extant
financial theory; capital structure theory, dividend theory, and the NPV rule;
and their relevance to entrepreneurial firms.
First we describe the attributes of entrepreneurial firms analyzed in this
paper. We exclude the majority of small businesses because they are in existing
industries. While the founding family or individuals maybe ‘entrepreneurial’ in
that they quit their jobs and invested all their savings in their new businesses,
extant corporate finance theory is still applicable. Typical factors such as
information, transaction costs, and agency issues (from business partners) may
be exacerbated in small businesses; nevertheless, the same principles and
solutions apply.
The key premise underlying our definition of a firm as entrepreneurial is
that the firm, or the new industry it may help create, has the potential to add
significantly to the wealth of the economy. The entrepreneurial firm creates
new sources of wealth from new products, new markets, and new applications,
and pulls in new users and consumers by uncovering hitherto unknown states
of nature, solutions to known and unknown human and social problems, and
altering the allocation of individuals’ time, lifestyles, and the nature of jobs.
Table 1 differentiates the entrepreneurial firm from the conventional firm.
It sets a high bar for the entrepreneurial firms: negative average NPV for all
firms and under uncertainty. Given that we previously specify entrepreneurial
activities grow the economy, it must necessarily be the case that individual
firms in the aggregate may not be able to privately capture all the private and
public benefits of their investments, the difference representing externalities
that benefit a broader segment of the economy. They are the unintended benefits
from new states created out of the realization of uncertainty. For instance, take
the ubiquitous smart phone. Although the original idea was to create a portable
handheld small phone, it was not expected to become a commerce and payment
system, a game system, a camera and album, a device for social networking, a
home security monitor, and a library. It spawned other businesses, which the
early investing firms could not capture or share. It even replaced a previous
generation’s innovations: location tracking via GPS, portable music and video
devices, the Palm Pilot, and now even credit cards. Society is also better off in
ways unexpected: farmers in less developed countries can find current spot
prices for their farm products and be freed from having to deal with
expropriating middlemen who monopolize price information; medical
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diagnoses can be made from photo images by far away specialists; educational
materials may be made available without having to be near a well stuffed
physical library; and, at very low transaction costs, it enable all sorts of
transactions including very low price items (e.g., soda) that would not have
been practical before. An economy with high participation of entrepreneurship
must also necessarily be more dynamic. This means that although some new
businesses may be created from new uses, some older businesses may have to
be replaced; e.g., Kodak and Fuji films are less readily available, and physical
checks may also be disappearing soon.
A. Investments by the entrepreneurial firms

The entrepreneurial firms as defined in Table 1 would not solely rely on the
traditional NPV > 0 rule for investment decisions. Reliable inputs to the NPV
calculations, in many cases, are simply not obtainable. Under uncertainty, it
would not be possible to estimate the magnitude of cash flows, as well as the
identity of the states of nature (i.e., list of possible outcomes in each time period
required for discounted cash flow calculations), and thus their probabilities are
not known or capable of being even imagined. The discount rate, which is a
product of aggregating various state prices, is not available. The lack of tangible
assets as collateral and residual assets at liquidation also reduce the ability to
estimate current value.
To summarize, the investment decision of the entrepreneurial firms is
defined by these two related notions:
1. For each entrepreneurial firm, and for all entrepreneurial firms in aggregate, the
expected NPV of entrepreneurial venture is negative.
2. From the standpoint of the entire economy, after considering all the beneficial
externalities that comes from the efforts of all entrepreneurial firms, the
expected aggregate NPV is positive.
I consider the negative NPV, individually and for a portfolio of projects, as
a distinguishing characteristics of a true entrepreneurial environment. If a
portfolio of projects has positive NPV, investment and financing of these firms,
albeit high risk, could be solved with more traditional approaches, such as via
aggregation, diversification, and securitization (see Hull, Lo, & Stein, 2017).
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Table 1: Differentiating the Entrepreneurial Firms
Averaged NPV
Unknowns

Frequency
Spanning
Tangible assets
Residual Assets at
Liquidation

Traditional Firm
NPV>0
Risks, probability distribution of payoffs
can be specified, i.e., known states,
probabilities, and payoffs.
Payoffs are often; across most states
All states are known
yes
yes

Entrepreneurial Firm
NPV<0
Uncertainty in its purest form:
unknown states and unknown payoffs.
Long shot; payoffs are rare events
Could create new states, and spanning
possibilities
Few to none
None

The will to commit one’s life to negative expected return pursuits is
entrepreneurial but not unique to business ventures. In fact, this spirit can be
found be among a significant number of individuals in a society. Witness the
number of athletes in high schools and colleges who aspired to be professional
players, as well as those who aspire to be actors, singers, performers, writers,
Nobel Prize caliber scientists, world class musicians, as well as those pursuing
pure honors with no monetary payoff, as in some Olympic events. These
examples demonstrate that in order to understand entrepreneurship, we need
not assume entrepreneurial persons are unique or irrational. It is just part of the
human spirit that is vital for the society to advance.
In the tradition of Adam Smith’s Law of the Uncoordinated Market, the
Invisible Hand (or the ‘First Law’), as a result of individuals using their own
information and meeting their own needs, produces the market price that
aggregates all information and achieves the best allocation. I postulate the
Second Law of the Uncoordinated Market as the Invisible Hand that, as a result
of individual entrepreneurs pursuing long odds ventures with negative
expected returns, produces positive benefits for the Economy as a whole. The
size of the Economy’s gain is a function of the number of entrepreneurs.
Countries in which the entrepreneurial spirit is not discouraged, where qualities
of risk taking, tolerance of failure, encouraging creativity, uniqueness,
individual accomplishments, and non-conformity are found to have more
innovations and economic growth.
Hence, when it comes to entrepreneurial finance, we neither need to be
burdened with textbook investment criterion that insists each investment pass
the positive NPV hurdle for an entrepreneur to undertake it, nor make the
assumption that entrepreneurs are rare and irrational.
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The real challenge here is the financing of the entrepreneurial ventures, in
face of negative returns on the average. There are two easy answers. The first
is through ‘self-financing.’ In terms of frequency, but not in the sum dollar
amount, this is the largest category. Here, the entrepreneurs internalize the
financing decision, albeit constrained by the amount available; one may say
investment and financing are joint decisions. The second convenient solution is
to refer all innovations with large externalities to the economy as the
responsibility of the government. This notion is correct in theory, as
government is the entity that can capture most of the externalities and distribute
the burden of financing through taxes and fees. However, this solution idealizes
what governments actually do. For example, if governments are capable of
providing financing for society-enriching ventures, we should not observe such
large differences in the rates of development among countries, or waste in the
use of these funds. Furthermore, given its constrained resources, a government
involving itself in venture financing would also require that the bureaucrats in
charge are able to excel in picking winners. Since returns to these new ventures
(representing new products, new industries, new uses, etc.) are highly uncertain
(given unknown states and their probabilities), it is doubtful that government
bureaucrats could make the best decisions to allocate limited funds to future
winners. Instead, the selection and allocation decisions would most likely be
influenced by political considerations and the intensity of the lobbying efforts.
To explain why for-profit individuals and other non-founder and nongovernment entities provide financing is more challenging. Fortunately,
entrepreneurial ventures do receive this outside funding and thus, the issue is
not whether they are funded, but rather why they are funded. I shall defer the
discussions of these finer points in financing entrepreneurial firms to a later
section; at this point, let us continue with the comparison of financing theory
for traditional finance versus entrepreneurial finance.
B. Taking stock of the extant capital structure theory

Capital structure theory has received one of the largest shares of attention in
corporate finance research, and is presumably among the best developed1. In
the following, I discuss the applicability of the two principal capital structure
theories (the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory) to the entrepreneurial
firms. Table 2 compares the traditional versus entrepreneurial firms under the
For a partial list of review articles on capital structure Theory, see: M. Baker and J. Wurgler (2002), M.Z. Frank
and V.K. Goyal (2003), J.R. Graham and M.T. Leary (2011), M. Harris and A. Raviv (1991), and C. Parsons and S.
Titman (2009).
1
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tradeoff theory of capital structure. The tradeoff theory is attractive because it
inherits a desirable property of economic optimization – there is an interior
optimum; i.e., it suggests optimal capital structures exist for different firms.
There is a glaring deficit in this theory even in the general, non-entrepreneurial
setting. The major benefit attributable to debt is the interest expense
deductibility of debt. A weakness in this explanation (possibly the only
rationale for debt in many applications) is that the use of debt by firms predates
the incidence of corporate tax (at 1% in the United States, and much later in
many other countries). The use of debt by businesses is as ancient as the earliest
traders needing capital. In truth, though current capital structure is not capable
of explaining debt use in most of the history, there is no mystery or missing
explanation. We know businesses are like the individuals in Irving Fisher
(1930)’s explanation that households use borrowing to smooth out
intertemporal consumption; i.e., households needing to spend now borrow and
repay with incomes in future periods, and thus achieve greater lifetime utility.
Likewise, business borrow to expand (buy more assets), expecting to generate
sufficient profits to pay back the debt in future periods. Debt is one of the first
financial innovations to allow businesses to expand their scale of operations
and, consequently, the size of the economy. For many purposes in the history
of commerce, debt served more than adequately for business activities of the
day (e.g., trading for needed inventory, farming in which land owners collect
fixed rent from tenants). The basic contractual terms of debt – either pay back
debt if the asset (or value of harvest) is worth more than debt owed (have net
surplus from trading after paying off debt), or give up the asset to satisfy debt
– elicit truth-telling and do not even require lenders to spend time and money
on information collection and verification. However, these circumstances are
no longer applicable to the type of business ventures among the modern
entrepreneurial firms.
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Table 2: Capital Structure Theory: Traditional vs. Entrepreneurial Firm
Factors for the tradeoff
Capital Structure theory
Reasons to limit debt
-Asymmetric
Information
-

Agency

-

Distress or
bankruptcy costs

Reasons to acquire debt
Taxes

Traditional Firm

Entrepreneurial Firm

A key assumption, insiders/managers
are assumed to know future outcomes
better with greater precision.
Another key assumption, implies there
exists slacks in the firm to be
appropriated.
Not insignificant for firms with real
and intangible assets.

Not assumed

Key, firms are assumed to have
taxable profits; crucial to explain debt
financing.
However, a weak link in the tradeoff
theory (toe explained).

Not likely to have taxable profits
prior to attend the status of the
traditional firm.

Few slacks

Reduced role for debt financing, and
lack of residual assets make this item
less relevant,

Table 2 summarizes and contrast the differences in the underlying set of
assumptions between the factors defining the capital structure of the traditional
versus that of the entrepreneurial firms. To understand entrepreneurial firms, I
shall use a broader definition of capital structure. Instead of the dichotomy
between debt and equity, or that those represent current claimholders of the
firm, I use an expanded definition that includes potential new features and
security design, as well as current and future contributors of funds. This allows
us to include arrangements for entrepreneurial firms such as sequential,
contingent financing in the future, or contributions to capital with no claim on
future cash flows or firm valuation; e.g., straight contributions for early
Kickstarter projects prior to the JOBS Act, and grants from foundations and
governmental agencies. Most importantly, I shall consider what we can do to
design financial instruments to overcome individuals’ resistance to become
entrepreneurs.
These standard theories concentrate mainly on two financial securities: debt
instruments with interest payments and repayment of principals as their main
contractual features, and equity that receives residual payments after debt
claims. Entrepreneurial ventures, by nature, are precluded from using
traditional debt instruments as they are not capable of generating continuous
periodic cash flows nor could fulfill the obligations to pay off debt at maturity,
on the average. The same condition also precludes the entrepreneurial firm from
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paying regular dividends to their equity investors. Thus, dividend is no longer
relevant and not requiring a theory.
III.

1.

2.

a.
b.

Reconciling the Entrepreneurial Investments and Financing Decisions
To say that extant finance theory is not useful for the entrepreneurial firms is
not the same as saying no solution has evolved to solve these topics in the real
world. Theories aim to be manageable and neat, and thus simplify the real world
and tackle the most obvious issues; i.e., traditional firms. A real world approach
is more akin to engineering. Engineers only aim to find a ‘good enough’
solution that represents the best one could do given the existing state of the art
in technology. The fact that many but not all entrepreneurial firms do receive
funding supports the notion that there exist ‘good enough’ solutions to the
correlated entrepreneurial financing and investment problems. The readers
know there exist those that provided funds to entrepreneurial firms including
venture capital funds (VC), angel investors, small investors through
Kickstarter, and some private equity and hedge funds.
As a way to summarize the big picture, we have:
For all ‘entrepreneurial’ projects, the aggregate NPV is negative by definition,
but positive for the economy after considering all externalities to the rest of the
economies. These are the benefits the entrepreneurs and innovators could not
personally capture.
Σ NPV (project i) < 0, adding up the NPV of all entrepreneurs; and
Σ NPV (projects i) + Σ (externalities to the rest of the economy) > 0.
One solution is for the government to subsidize (i.e., spend tax payers’ money
to fund entrepreneurs directly). There are two ways the government can
subsidize innovation for the whole economy, though keep in mind that in both
cases the sum of all subsidies is a net drain on the economy.
Government gives equal and proportional subsidies to all innovation
activities; or
Government chooses which projects to subsidize.
In the real world, the government is not an entity that is impartial and
omniscient. It is made up of self-interested politicians and bureaucrats, subject
to the lobbying efforts by other interested parties. In the case of (a), proportional
and equal subsidy of all projects making request after satisfied certain
promulgated guidelines, there will be an incentive to create of too many
additional and nonexistent projects just to receive the subsidy. Condition (a)
will not be sustainable, as the number of initial projects to be designated as
entrepreneurial will be far greater under subsidy than without subsidy.
ANG * THEORY FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS * 9
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3.

4.

5.

6.

The situation would not be much better under (b). It confers new power to
politicians and bureaucrats to be handed out to friends, relatives, and whomever
pays them bribes or kickbacks. Even in an ideal world of no corruption, were
government bureaucrats and politicians asked to pick future winners, could
monies be wisely allocated to the winning technologies in the uncertain future
to those entrepreneurs who are more likely to succeed?
Finally, we deal with the real world. We do observe entrepreneurs receiving
financing in addition to funds from their own resources and those of their
friends and families. Our task here is simplified; we need not invent new
solutions for funding entrepreneurs, but rather to provide rationale for the
current practice and seek ways to further refine and improve it.
There are at least three explanations: sorting, matching, and hoping. One way
to increase the overall profitability of entrepreneurial investments is to trim the
clearly negative project proposals from the list. Sorting occurs when those with
experience and technical expertise can perform this task. Since the size of the
pool of those with these professional skills increases with experience gained
over time and the number of potential entrepreneurial projects evaluated, the
relative growth from the entrepreneurial sector of one economy versus another
would also depend on the number and maturity of these professionals. The
entrepreneurial activities of the most active economies would beget even more
entrepreneurial activities – and the rich get richer.
Matching occurs when those with specific preferences and beliefs give funding
to ventures with objectives that are consistent with theirs, even if some ventures
may not yield a positive NPV in the conventional sense. Beliefs prompt
investors to support green projects, religious projects, humanitarian projects,
urban renewal, and education, for example. Preferences prompt investors to
support ventures with long odds or lottery-like payoff characteristics, payoffs
in some specific states, or to experience excitement in the resolution of a true
sense of uncertainty; i.e., the discovery of hitherto nonexistent states.
Hoping, for a lack of better term, refers to those who provide financing in hopes
of being able to sell to another at a higher price later. Hoping to sell to others at
higher price later is a far more significant economic behavior than the credit it
receives from the finance and economic literature would suggest. It accounts
for most of the trading involving securities, future and option contracts on
goods not expected for physical delivery at maturity, and the flipping of real
estate. I use the neutral term ‘hoping,’ but an alternative could be ‘to expect a
greater fool’ (“Although the price I paid is high, there is a greater fool who will
pay an even higher price for me to unload.”) There are those who provide
funding for new ventures, not expecting to wait till resolution of uncertainty or
ANG * THEORY FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS * 10
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revelation of a payoff, but instead exit at an earlier time. Early exit could result
from refinancing in later rounds of venture financing, the sale of the
entrepreneurial firm to another, or an IPO. The rise of so called over one billion
dollars valuation ‘Unicorns’ is partly the result of those who acquiesce to the
publicized high valuation in spite of knowing that it is inflated. They know the
so called valuation is extrapolated from what a new investing group would pay
for only a small fraction of the firm. Recall that demand curve is downward
sloping, the price paid for the first 5% represents its highest valuation, and one
should not expect the rest of the 95% to be worth as much.
7. For ease of discussion, we refer to all providers of financing to entrepreneurs
as venture capital investors (VCs); they may alternatively be known as angel
investors, venture capital funds, or Kickstarter investors.
To say that VCs are willing to fund the entrepreneurial firms, it must be the
case that this new condition holds:
Σ NPV (project j) > 0, project j < project i; j < i,
where project j is the abridged list formed by the VC by selecting from the
original set, project i, according to their screening process.
The remaining project set after screening is now:
Σ NPV (project j, θ) = Σ NPV (all projects, θ) − Σ NPV (project i) < 0) > 0,
where θ represents the development and specialization of the VC; hence this
equation represents the contribution of the VC.
More specifically, the development and specialization (θ) of the VC allows
them to cull the entrepreneurial projects, eliminating the non-fundable projects
(e.g., the premature, poorly justified, and those lacking exclusivity) and
entrepreneurs (e.g., the unqualified, overly optimistic, and overconfident).
In the following, I shall discuss how these practical solutions work, given
the current state of finance ‘technology.’
As discussed above, given the nature of entrepreneurial ventures where
returns (e.g., NPV) are on average negative, funding by individuals or
governments alone will end up funding too many losers. Hence, we must
recognize that what are needed as necessary prerequisites to funding
entrepreneurial firms are: 1) the existence of those who specialize in filtering
out extremely poor ideas and can hence raise the average NPV; and 2) the
people these specialists can attract (or themselves) that are willing to supply the
funds to support the remaining new ventures. For our purpose, I shall call them
financial entrepreneurs. In a capsule, a healthy environment for new ventures
to incubate and grow needs the twin necessary conditions:
idea/investment/asset entrepreneurs, and financial entrepreneurs.
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1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Financial entrepreneurs, as gate keepers, sort ventures and filter out poor
projects through:
The experience of the VC, which accumulates through apprenticeship and
trials, with the knowledge and experience to filter out most if not all potential
entrepreneurs needing funds who have unrealistic expectations or are overly
confident, overly optimistic, not prepared, or not able or willing to collect
information on the market or competing technologies. Interestingly, although
theory has a hard time dealing with these behavioral biases without losing rigor,
practicing financial entrepreneurs regularly deal with these types and hence
develop coping strategies.
Having a simple single objective to either make money for themselves or their
investors. They are not distracted by entrepreneurs’ behavioral bias (as in the
case of self-financing), or burdened by political considerations, such as ‘tit for
tat’ and bribery, as in the case of government funding.
Taking long term view. These financial entrepreneurs have long time horizon,
as their ability to raise funds and thus create wealth for themselves depends on
their previous performance record over several deals. That is, their utility from
the return of a venture includes not only that of the present venture but also that
of future ventures. Here, the financial entrepreneurs’ horizon may span several
generations of innovators and investment entrepreneurs.
Providing expertise that the investment entrepreneurs do not have, could not
afford, or, even worse, do not know they need. The marginal costs (finding,
selecting, and paying) incurred by the investment entrepreneurs to get expert
opinion and knowledge may be high; however, the marginal costs to the
financial entrepreneurs dispensing financial and market related advice are quite
small due to repeated dealings and specialization in a certain product or market.
Serving as a watchdog and partner. Due to the nature of entrepreneurial
investments; i.e., low payoff and long gestation period; finance entrepreneurs,
who have the stronger bargaining position, demand timely access to
information, control of the board, and have the power to replace managers. This
arrangement eliminates most of insiders’ information advantage and reduce the
risk of opportunistic behavior. The two related concerns in the traditional
finance theory, asymmetric information and agency, are much reduced and
even eliminated in cases when the finance entrepreneurs have the deciding role.
Offering a more objective view of the firm. Even wealth maximizing founders
funding 100% of the venture with their own money are still capable of
possessing serious value-destroying behavioral biases. Founders are known to
hold on to losers too long because so much time and personal wealth has been
invested (the “sunk cost” fallacy), a “next time will be different and better”
ANG * THEORY FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS * 12
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1.

2.

3.
4.

mentality, and wishful thinking that valuation is not high enough to sell or to
create an IPO. Finance entrepreneurs look at the venture with a more objective
lens and come from a position of greater experience, knowing about more about
similar companies and situations, and hence can provide sounder decisions
(improving welfare economy wide, as well as for the founder) regarding when
to expand or quit.
Researchers incorporating some or all of these features could generate a
model of investments and financing for the entrepreneurial firm. The model
would not be complete, however, without also incorporating its potential
negative aspects. Because investment entrepreneurs and financial entrepreneurs
are different individuals, there are inevitable conflicts of interest. The financial
entrepreneur’s priority is to look after his or her own interests first, followed by
those of the individuals that invested with them and their standing in the
investment community. Specific areas of conflict includes:
Exit. Financial entrepreneurs such as venture capital and private equity funds,
dealing with startups, are inherently more patient than the average institutional
investor. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why their expected holding
periods are shorter than those of the founders and original investors. One, as
professional managers, they need to report and harvest favorable investment
results sooner in order to raise their profile and reputation. Two, they have
other, perhaps more attractive, opportunities in which to invest. In other words,
funded ventures also have to compete against other existing and potential
ventures. Three, those working in venture capital and private equity funds are
individuals, who in their desire to raise their profiles and personal reputations
in order to move out or have funds of their own, have even shorter time horizons
than those of the companies employing them.
Power. Financial entrepreneurs are often in more powerful bargaining position
than the investment entrepreneurs in both pre and post funding. They often
dictate the terms of the funding. After funding, they collectively control the
company’s board and with enough ownership control may even replace the
founders.
Capture. Once the financial entrepreneur has funded an earlier round, they may
also control the next funding rounds – including when, and who can participate.
Conflicts. Financial entrepreneurs may easily blur the line between monitoring,
which is their province, and management, which is not. In an entrepreneurial
firm with a longer funding history, there may be different classes of financial
entrepreneurs with different priorities, claims on assets, current holdings, and
options for shares, which could result in more frictions among them.
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5. Expectations. Financial entrepreneurs investing in startups with extremely high
valuation but no profit; i.e., the unicorns; will end up with unmet expectations.
Sooner or later, they will face the prospect of large portfolio loss and will look
after their own interests at the expense of the startup.
Taking inventory, the factors listed above may be regarded as the building
blocks of an entrepreneurial firm’s investment and financing model. The
positive and negative factors may also lead to a tradeoff solution. What is
notable is that the model for the entrepreneurial firms do not resemble, nor are
they an extension of, the traditional investment and financing model of capital
structure.
IV.

Reformulating the Financing Problem of the Entrepreneurial Firm.

In this section, I shall shift the traditional focus of capital structure, based on
the mix of debt and equity and choices at the margin given a firm’s current
leverage, to one that is entrepreneur centric. The discussion is developed in
stages, from simple to more complex. The entrepreneur is assumed to be
rational; i.e., his or her objective is to maximize lifetime personal wealth, with
refinements to be included later.
A. First model: Outside financing provides needed funds and risk sharing.

Here, as in many cases, the entrepreneur has the idea and energy but does not
have adequate funds for current as well as future investments. Payoff, if it shall
occur, will be large, albeit not immediate. In each future stage t (i.e., an
intermediate period), more information ϕt about final payoff be revealed, ϕt+1 >
ϕt > ϕ t-1. At any intermediate period, the information set has two signals: the
idea is worthless (ϕn = 0) or there is a possibility of a potential payoff (ϕc > 0).
The size of potential payoff increases with each continuation stage. The value
of the future payoff, ϕt, at each t may be regarded as an option. At the beginning
at time 0, the entrepreneur faces the decision of whether to start the
entrepreneurial venture (a low probability, high payoff project). The
entrepreneur’s objective function is to maximize his or her expected final
wealth, or:
Max ET (αf ϕf)
where αf is the entrepreneur’s share of the final payoff, ϕf. ET is the value
function of the utility to the entrepreneur; it elements include: time value, risk
aversion, control of own destiny, pride, and recognition as an innovator. The
entrepreneur’s payoff is subject to an opportunity cost constraint that the
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expected final payoff, ET(αf ϕf ), not be less than lifetime alternative sources of
income,
ET(αf ϕf ) > Σt wt,
where Σt wt is the summation of all future potential wages. The financing
constraint, or the amount of outside funds needed, is:
I0 – F0 (e, ff) < VC0
where I0 is the initial outlay (e.g., personnel, facilities, equipment, licensing,
and rights) to start or “get one’s foot in the door” in the case of a race among
other competing entrepreneurs. F0 (e, ff) is the original seed money, from own
resources, e, and friends and family, ff. VC0 is the value of the funds to be
financed by outsiders, such as, venture capital firms or angels. In this model,
there is only one funding period. Thus, the ownership claims to the payoff
between the entrepreneur and those providing outside financing are distributed
as {α = F0/ I0, and (1−α) = VC0/ I0}.
The model as formulated is one of the entrepreneur needing outside
financing to provide funds she may not have or want to risk; i.e., financing
needs and risk sharing. Solving the problem involves specifying the
entrepreneur’s measure of willingness to take risk (or risk aversion; this term is
not incompatible with the requirements for entrepreneurship), size of
investment, and range of funds from own and friends and family to solve (3)
for the amount of outside funds needed, VC0 (or, equivalently, solving for {α =
F0/ I0, and (1−α) = VC0/ I0 }), or, alternatively, to solve (3) for the amount F0
(e, ff); and to solve for last but not least, the range of values for the final payoff,
E[ϕf](l,h).
B. Second model: Choose a larger slice of a smaller pie or a smaller slice of a larger pie.

The first extension is to allow the model to incorporate stage financing, i.e.,
new outside funds are to be needed and provided in future periods. This requires
at least a three period model: an initial period, an intermediate period, and a
final period. In the intermediate period, as in above, there are two states:
termination (ϕn,t = 0), and continuation (ϕc,t > 0) with probabilities (1−ρ) and ρ,
where ρ <<<<(1−ρ); i.e., low success probability for the entrepreneurial firm.
Here, the continuation state refers to the option to invest more funds, It, for
payoff to be realized in the next or final period {ϕn,t+1 = 0, ϕc,t+1 > 0}. The
entrepreneur has the choice of either: a) raising the entire amount, (I0 + I1), in
the initial period and giving up {(1−α)1-stage= (VC0 + I1)/(I0 + I1)= (VC0 +
VC1)/(I0 + I1)} of the firm’s equity, or b) raise the fund in two stages; VC0 in
the initial period, and I1 in the second period; and give up{(1−α)2-stage= (VC0/ I0
)+ (VC1/I1) = (VC0I1 + VC1I0) /(I0 + I1)}. Since the firm’s value after revelation
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of a positive payoff continuation state ϕc,t, if occurred, is greater than the firm’s
initial value, the entrepreneur gives up less equity in the two stage solution,
(1−α) 1-stage > (1−α)2-stage. However, if the termination state occurs in the onestage financing case, the firm is liquidated and the entrepreneur receives {α1stage (It)} (or, equivalently, {α1-stage (VCt)}) share of the unspent amount raised.
Hence, there is a tradeoff.
An important special case in practice is when the probability of success, ρ,
is function of the amount of initial investment I0,ρ(I0, It+1) . This may occur when
there exists a first mover advantage, such as in new drugs introduction, or in
defense contracting competition. Having the final payoff a function of initial
and subsequent investments, ϕf (I0, It+1), means the entrepreneur’s problem is
one of choosing between a larger slice of a smaller pie, versus a smaller slice
of a bigger pie.
C. Third Model: Could there be a role for a debt type financing in an entrepreneurial firm?

Previously, I show that the usual type of debt, requiring periodic interest
payment with fixed maturity, could not exist in an entrepreneurial firms with
long periods of no or little cash inflow. However, there is a desirable property
of debt, versus outside equity, that makes some modified version of debt
financing worth considering. Debt type financing allows the entrepreneur to
retain existing equity.
Here, I shall discuss the desirable properties of a debt like security such that
it could exist in an entrepreneurial firm. First, it could not be a single payment
debt with cumulative interest. Although the cumulative interest feature is
desirable to the entrepreneurs as it postpone cash payments (interest) in all
intermediate periods, the single payment of debt supersedes the single payment
of equity for the VC. Recall the nature of payoff in the entrepreneurial firm
where probability of payoff is small but the amount realized is very large; this
means that both single payment debt and equity will receive nothing in the nopayoff state. However, even if the payoff is large enough for both debt and
equity in positive payoff final state, this means only that the debt payment will
be less than the start-up’s final value; there is no guarantee that the remaining
equity will cover the investments of the VC. Second, since debt like financing
for the entrepreneurial firm could only occur when debt has a high positive
probability of being repaid in the intermediate period, the condition for some
modified form of debt is that there is a reason to support such belief.
Before I discuss these circumstances, I would like to emphasize a special
role played by a debt like securities that mature in an intermediate period. To
the entrepreneur, an intermediate period maturing debt may be regarded as a
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vehicle to provide financing that would otherwise mean giving up more equity
in an earlier round. That is, it enables the entrepreneur to raise equity in a much
later stage, in which, hopefully, equity may fetch higher valuation. The role of
this ‘bridge’ to equity is particularly important to entrepreneurs who want to
minimize ownership concession to outside investors and retain control of the
firm.
Consider three sources of value where holders of debt like securities in an
entrepreneurial firm may expect to be repaid in a future intermediate period.
First, as in any form of lending, having sufficient assets to pledge as collateral
serves as a sufficient requirement. However, when applied to asset poor
entrepreneurial firms, only a relatively small percentage of new venture firms
with some type of assets may qualify. Alternatives to assets, which can be
pledged, are milestones to be achieved in a multistage financing. Milestones
signify tangible progress but may not be readily sold or pledged as security.
Thus, we are left with few assets that could be used as collateral from
entrepreneurial firms with no sales. Examples include important patents, a
database of potential customers, or insurance policies of key scientists. The
second instance is not based on a sufficient condition but rather on an
expectational one. A lender’s willingness to lend is partially based on the
expectation that the debt could be refinance by another party (debt or equity
investors). Implicit in this condition is the expectation that the entrepreneurial
firm could sustain an increasing valuation at least at or beyond the maturity of
the debt. The phenomenon is similar to why some investors paid a high
valuation for the so-called unicorns, where the expectation is to be able to sell
to another investor at even higher price. The third is a debt security (e.g.,
contingent convertible or CoCo bond) that would be converted into equity
under certain conditions; in the case of entrepreneurial finance, the condition is
the inability to redeem and refinance maturing debt, or securities that would
automatically rollover, as in PIK (pay in kind), in which more debt securities
are issued in lieu of interests that the borrower does not have. However, VCs
would find this condition undesirable unless the firm value is only temporarily
depressed.
To summarize, we can see that the financing problem of an entrepreneurial
firm revolves around two related issues: minimize equity dilution and retain
management control of the firm while maximizes the entrepreneur’s wealth.

V.

Is there a role for behavioral finance in the financing of entrepreneurs?
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It is inevitable that behavioral considerations are involved in the process of
financing the entrepreneurial firms, since it is dealing with individuals making
long term decisions under uncertainty. These have both positive and negative
roles. The fact that the entrepreneur could easily commit mistakes such as being
overconfident and overly optimistic, causing them to plunge ahead, may not be
his or her own long term utility maximizing behavior, but the acts could still
result in positive externalities for the economy as a whole. The unintended
consequences of their pioneering actions show later entrepreneurs what paths
are and are not to be taken and help speed up the development of the new ideas
and products. Consequently, an economy lacking such individuals could lag
behind. To a smaller extent, behavioral decision making may also hinder
entrepreneurial ventures. One is the potential entrepreneur’s inability to
calculate. To illustrate, suppose the entrepreneur understands the odds of
success in the same product category even among the venture funded projects
is only one in four. In this case, the VC would expect returns that reflect the
commonly agreed odds; i.e., having to lose three out of four investments. The
VC would then demand, as term for funding, for each venture to return four
times the normal return. The entrepreneur may either balk or grudgingly accept
as if being asked to “give up a pound of flesh” to the VC. Their failure to
calculate is the inability to see that if they end up among the three out of four
that failed, they will enjoy a free ride at the expense of the VC and indirectly
will be the sole winner. Their behavioral mistake is to expect they are most
likely to be the one out of four winner, in spite of the objectively higher odds
of failure. VCs also may also exhibit behavioral mistakes that may both increase
funding and reduce funding for the entrepreneurs. The VC managers may
increase funding if they believe in “hot hands” after a successful venture, or to
follow other VCs (herding) into a new industry or product category, and they
may also supply more funds to a losing venture due to loss aversion and sunk
costs. This behavior would even be more prevalent among the less sophisticated
or experienced fund providers, such as angels and Kickstarter investors who
may choose to finance ventures, not based on rational economic calculations,
but rather for their own personal or even behavioral reasons, such as noise and
fads. Furthermore, friends and family, the first outside funding sources, often
provide funds out of an affinity bias. On the other hand, funding may be reduced
when managers at a VC have limited or no experience with successful ventures
and thus use a small observed sample to infer the next project’s chance of
success. Additionally, fear of making a mistake may lead them to apply an extra
high hurdle to receiving funding. The same concerns may also cause some VCs
to withdraw from a venture too soon. Finally, there are the serial entrepreneurs
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who keep score in a different way. They see entrepreneurship analogous to a
sporting game – it is how often you win, and the winning margin is not as
important.
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VI.
Conclusions
In the larger scheme of things, investment entrepreneurs must precede financial
entrepreneurs. Investment entrepreneurs originate the business idea, create
innovations, and invent new things. No amount of investable funds could
generate economic growth without the ideas and drives of the investment
entrepreneurs. The financial entrepreneurs serve as gatekeepers to screen out
poorly conceived projects, and to provide monitoring and management
expertise.
The entrepreneur’s financing problem is one of deciding to take a “larger
slice of a smaller pie, or a smaller slice of a bigger pie.” Failure to reconcile the
desire to maximize lifetime wealth versus “control” of their creations may end
up no funding at all.
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